As argued above, the conscious agent is unwillingly drugged into ‘believing’ in FW though this belief is objectively false. The question is whether Selleck DAPT this apparent contradiction leads to a deadlock or, rather, is the necessary preamble to something else. As we’ll see in detail in TBM, FW illusion is perceived not to drive the intentional action, but simply to make the agent feel responsible for the action and to foster further cognitive processes. This second hypothesis avoids the pitfall of the soul-body duality by making subjectivity of primary importance in cognition; this is a noteworthy difference from other cognitive models.

Our model stems from the hypothesis that it is simply because a conscious agent without FW

Dasatinib would mean nothing in its own eyes that the subjective perspective of FW is so difficult to abandon. The denial of FW would be a sort of suicide. We must, therefore, consider two different points of view but arrive at a single conclusion. If we embrace a reductionist approach (the author’s view), brain and mind are the same thing. Thus the persistence of duality and the belief in FW both reside in a psychological error: the agent’s mind identifies the self with a body-independent entity (or soul) which, however is a product of mind. Thus an endless circuit of false attributions is activated without the objective approval of any outside observer. Instead in this dualism the mind is a “different thing” from the Glutamate dehydrogenase brain, living a life of its own, and need not be vindicated by the brain. According to a dualist tradition, intuition to an attentive mind is so easy and distinct that there is no doubt about what we comprehend and that we should search for truth by the light of nature. In nature, our ego might not be in the same space–time dimension as the brain and brain events (Krader, 2010), then self-identification of ego with soul can neither be proved nor

disproved by brain activity. In summary, according to the reductionist view, the conscious agent erroneously believes to possess FW; while according to the dualist perspective the existence of FW might be true. From whatever point of view we address the question, we can infer, firstly, that the persistence of the idea of a body-independent spiritual entity instantiated in our mind is imperishable, despite the fact that the body is physically deteriorating (the inner sensation that accompanies the sense of self is “sameness,” an inferential activity instantiated in the prefrontal cortex (James, 1980 and Van Den Berg et al., 2011); secondly, that this sense of self brings with it the idea of possessing FW. The first-person perspective on FW existence may be a subjective experience rooted in fundamental human needs, that’s why it is a globally shared phenomenon despite its blend of theism and atheism.