Different resource, stakeholder and

market attributes call for different modes of governance. Uses such as fishing within bounded zones may be governed by bureaucratic, communal or market-based means. Use rights must be big enough in space Cabozantinib concentration and time to promote resource conservation and can be integral to the rationalization and reduction of fishing effort. At the same time, the creation of use rights leads to winners and losers and can be contentious. In developing countries with unequal power relations, political marginalization and weak governance, creation of use rights has the potential for ‘elite capture’ and the further impoverishment of poor people through loss of access to ecosystem services, particularly if MSP is targeted on aggregate economic indicators (Daw et al., 2011). As well as dealing equitably with groups of widely differing political power, governance systems under MSP must deal effectively

with diverse uses and interests on multiple, nested spatial and temporal scales. This requires that governance systems be comprehensive in the sense that they cover the entire area within a jurisdiction and include all legitimate uses and interests. Governance this website systems also need to operate at multiple, nested scales matching those at which resources and their uses are structured and interact (Berkes, 2010). This could pave the way for nested, place-based institutions: integrated (overall regional oversight), coordinating (across-zone coordination), and specialist zone agencies (e.g. fisheries management in one Histamine H2 receptor zone). Polycentrism – networks of governing bodies that may have partly overlapping jurisdictions and roles, and which may arise or dissolve in response to

functional needs may be the most realistic vision for achieving this. Indeed, few cases of MSP to date have led to reorganization of governance structures (Collie et al., 2013). Perhaps the most easily grasped benefit of MSP is that, by establishing boundaries and facilitating the emergence of rights-based governance systems, it can create conditions that foster long-term incentives for resource users to restore degraded resources and ecosystem services. This may be done through complete protection in the most ecologically valuable areas and through fishing within sustainable limits in other areas that are capable of supplying high levels of ecosystems services without further intervention. Sustainable use can be incentivized by having beneficiaries invest in the protection of ecologically critical sites and the effective management or restoration of the wider areas.